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I. INTRODUCTION
Thus far there have been two phases in the critical reception of Isaiah
Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty (Two Concepts).1 The first saw the
argument for negative liberty as being primarily negative and
consequentialist in nature. It was seen as a negative, in that much of the
philosophical work in the essay was concerned with pointing out the
limitations of negative liberty’s positive counterpart. It was consequentialist,
in that what was seen to be wanting with positive liberty was not
inherent to the concept itself, but rather had to do with its potentially
noxious political implications.
* Professor, Département de philosophie, Université de Montréal. This paper
was presented at the Law Faculty of the University of Ottawa; at the Conference on
Isaiah Berlin, Value Pluralism, and the Law at the University of San Diego School of
Law; and as a plenary address to the annual conference of the Graduate Student Association
of Concordia University’s Philosophy Department. I wish to thank audiences at all of
these events for their comments and discussions. In particular, I wish to thank CharlesMaxime Panaccio and Adam Kolber for their extensive written comments.
1. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118
(1969).
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Read in this manner, the argument contained in the essay has not aged
particularly well. The Cold War context that inspired this line of
argument and interpretation is now part of history, and so this reading of
the text risks relegating it to merely antiquarian interest, alongside such
other Cold War texts as Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its
Enemies2 and J.L. Talmon’s The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy.3
A second period of philosophical reception of the text dug
philosophically deeper. Concentrating on the final section of the text,
commentators such as George Crowder pointed out the connection
between the value pluralism expounded there and the defense of
negative liberty. To rehearse the argument in a nutshell, if values are
irreducibly plural, then human agents navigating through this plurality
need a measure of negative liberty in order to fashion a life for
themselves out of the many equally plausible ways that there are of
combining these values into a flourishing human life.4 Taking his
bearings from the same value pluralism, John Gray famously saw Berlin
as laying the foundation for a postliberal politics, one from which Berlin
himself ultimately shied away.5
In this essay, I want to suggest a third line of argument that can be
retrieved from Two Concepts. It is primarily methodological. It enjoins
political theorists to define the extension of normative concepts in a
manner that makes as perspicuous as possible the various normative
considerations that are relevant to political decisionmaking. Although
related to the pluralist defense of negative freedom briefly alluded to
above, I will suggest that it is distinct from it, and that it allows us to
address important but underappreciated lacunae that beset the argument
from value pluralism, as well as the argument according to which
negative liberty is on consequentialist grounds to be preferred to positive
liberty.
I will proceed as follows. I will first lay out the argument as I believe
that it can be extracted from Two Concepts and from Berlin’s work more
broadly. I will then provide three independent arguments that I believe
can be mounted in favour of the principle of methodological parsimony
that I will be ascribing to Berlin. In a third part, I will distinguish the
2. KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (5th ed. rev. 1966).
3. J.L. TALMON, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIAN DEMOCRACY (1960). For a recent
reading of Two Concepts of Liberty along these lines, see James Tully, Two Concepts of
Liberty in Context (Oct. 18, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Isaiah
Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty” 50 Years Later Conference held at the University of
British Columbia, Vancouver).
4. See, e.g., GEORGE CROWDER, ISAIAH BERLIN: LIBERTY AND PLURALISM (2004).
See also Daniel Weinstock, The Graying of Berlin, 11 CRITICAL REV. 481, 487–89
(1997).
5. JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN 145–46 (1996).
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argument from methodological parsimony from the argument from
pluralism. I will show that the former argument provides better grounds
than does the latter for negative rather than positive liberty. I will also
show that it provides a needed complement to the consequentialist
argument against positive liberty that, as I suggested, corresponds with
the first period of critical reception. Throughout, I will show that the
principle of methodological pluralism provides a needed corrective to
contemporary theories of freedom situated within the negative liberty
family that do not satisfy the criterion of parsimony advocated by Berlin
in Two Concepts.
II. BERLIN’S ARGUMENT FOR METHODOLOGICAL PARSIMONY:
A RECONSTRUCTION
Let me begin by quoting from a very well-known early section of Two
Concepts:
Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or
culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience. If the liberty of myself or
my class or nation depends on the misery of a number of other human beings,
the system which promotes this is unjust and immoral. But if I curtail or lose
my freedom, in order to lessen the shame of such inequality, and do not thereby
materially increase the individual liberty of others, an absolute loss of liberty
occurs.6

At first glance, this may seem like merely a statement of the value
pluralism that Berlin expounds in greater detail in the final section of the
essay. There are a variety of values, Berlin is saying, and it is a mistake
to conflate them, or to suppose that they all somehow hang together in
one intellectually and morally satisfying whole.
This is of course partly true, but I want to suggest that something
slightly different is going on in this passage. To see this, let me
distinguish between four different kinds of philosophical theses that are
relevant to the overall task of devising a philosophically satisfying
pluralist theory, but that must nonetheless be clearly distinguished.
First, value pluralism is a metaethical thesis. It claims that there are a
variety of ends worthy of human pursuit, and that they cannot be
expressed according to a unifying single metric. It is in this manner
opposed to monism, which is the claim that the plurality of values is only

6.

BERLIN, supra note 1, at 125.
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apparent.7 It is also opposed to relativism, which is the view that there is
no rational way to adjudicate among the very many considerations that
different people and groups take to be values. As such, value pluralism
is a cognitivist position, according to which reason can allow us to
distinguish real and sham values, but that it cannot express all real
values in terms of one metavalue.
Second, it is important to see that metaethical pluralism is agnostic on
questions of ontology. Some pluralists may believe that values are real,
that is, independent of human willing and desire. Some may be
constructivists. Constructivists believe that values do not exist independently
of the operations of the human mind.8
Third, value pluralism as a metaethical thesis is agnostic as between
different first-order pluralist theories. That is, it tells us that there are
many different values, but it does not tell us what these values are.
Pluralists may agree on metaethical and even on ontological matters but
differ completely at the substantive level at which the variety of values
that there are specified.
Finally, and relatedly, there are questions of discovery. How do we go
about discovering the values that there are? Many pluralists have
historically been intuitionists—Sir W. David Ross9—and though intuitionism
is still philosophically alive—most notably in the writings of Robert
Audi10—it has been on the defensive especially in light of the criticisms
leveled against it by John Rawls.11 The problem is that it is not clear
which alternative method of inquiry pluralists can mobilize other than
recourse to intuition in order to carry out the important task of
constructing substantive pluralist theories. Thus, for example, one
pluralist theory that has received a great deal of philosophical attention
in recent years, the capabilities theory associated with the work of
Amartya Sen and of Martha Nussbaum,12 has been plagued by its
inability to come up with a philosophically convincing account of the
kinds capabilities that there are.

7. A prominent contemporary exponent of a pluralist metaethics is Michael
Stocker. See, e.g., MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES (1990).
8. A leading constructivist is John Rawls. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, Kantian
Constructivism in Moral Theory, in COLLECTED PAPERS 303 (Samuel Freeman ed.,
1999).
9. E.g., W. DAVID ROSS, FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS (1939).
10. E.g., ROBERT AUDI, THE GOOD IN THE RIGHT: A THEORY OF INTUITION AND
INTRINSIC VALUE (2004).
11. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 34–40 (1971).
12. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992). See also MARTHA
NUSSBAUM, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 203 (R. Bruce
Douglass et al. eds., 1990).
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Where does Berlin stand on these various issues? Berlin is not a
systematic philosopher, and Two Concepts does not lay out a fully
developed ethical theory. But there are elements of Berlin’s overall
philosophical strategy that allow us to make some headway.
First, and most importantly, whatever one thinks of the
consequentialist argument leveled by Berlin against positive liberty, it
matters to my purposes that it is a consequentialist, rather than an a
priori, conceptual argument. Berlin is not ruling the positive sense of
freedom out of conceptual court as somehow incoherent or selfcontradictory. Rather, he is claiming that it lends itself more readily
than its negative counterpart does to political abuses. The way in which
we delineate and rank values must therefore to some degree be sensitive
to the uses to which such values can be put. This suggests that for Berlin
the values that we choose to include in our axiological repertoire, and
the manner in which we rank them within that repertoire, are a function
of the consequences to which their use gives rise. As a pluralist, Berlin
is committed to cognitivism, lest his position lapse into relativism. But
the “instrumentalism” that I have just ascribed to him suggests that he is
not a realist, as that term is usually employed in philosophical debates.
That is, he does not believe that the extension of a concept can be
determined by just looking at the way things are in the area of value or
by mere linguistic conceptual analysis. Indeed, his break with Oxfordstyle analytic philosophy can be read as having in significant measure to
do with its inability to correctly grasp the historically embedded
meaning of ethical and political terms.13
Berlin believed that not only the understanding, but also the very
identification of values, depends upon historical context. Thus, for
example, he wrote that “‘each political philosophy responds to the needs
of its own times and is fully intelligible only in terms of all the relevant
factors of its age, and intelligible to us only to the degree to which . . .
we have experience in common with previous generations.’”14
But Berlin’s historicism also has implications to do with what political
and moral values are for. Thus, in a letter, he wrote that “‘[p]olitical

13. For a fascinating study of Berlin’s early philosophical confrontations with
logical positivists and their impact on his later work in political thought, see Jamie Reed,
From Logical Positivism to ‘Metaphysical Rationalism’: Isaiah Berlin on the ‘Fallacy of
Reduction,’ 29 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 109 (2008).
14. Joshua L. Cherniss, Introduction to ISAIAH BERLIN, POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE
ROMANTIC AGE, at xxiv (Henry Hardy ed., 2006).

843

WEINSTOCK FINAL ARTICLE

12/28/2009 10:50 AM

words and notions and acts . . . are not intelligible save in the context of
the issues that divide the men who use them.’”15 And in the long
“Introduction”—in fact a response to critics—to Four Essays on Liberty,
he wrote that “[t]here are many values which men have disputed, and for
and against which they have fought, that are not mentioned in some
earlier phase of history, either because they are assumed without
question, or because men are, whatever the cause, in no condition to
conceive of them.”16
These passages suggest that the embeddedness of concepts to
historical context is akin to the connection of tools to a task. Concepts
emerge that allow people to make sense of the problems that they face,
and that allows them to address the conflicts and debates that emerge
through the natural evolution of their common lives. Values in Berlin’s
view do not emerge unless they are necessitated by some feature of the
epoch in which people lead their lives, and by debates, disagreements,
and crises that emerge within those epochs.
This historical instrumentalism has an implication for the kind of
cognitivism that best characterizes Berlin’s theory. Value terms are
assessed not on the basis of their matching up with some preexisting
moral reality. Rather, their assessment depends upon their appropriateness
to the practical tasks to which they are to be put. People can be wrong in
the conceptualizations that they provide of the predicaments in which
they find themselves, just as a person setting out to do any job can be
mistaken in the assessment of the best tools with which to do the job in
question. In the very important essay entitled Political Ideas in the
Twentieth Century—included in the same volume as the one in which
Two Concepts was reprinted, but unjustly overshadowed by its more
famous companion—Berlin chronicles the philosophical errors that in
his view have come to dominate the twentieth century.17 Comparing the
Enlightenment period with the “new outlook” that had become dominant
in his day, Berlin writes that whereas in the context of the former, “there
was at least one premis[e] common to all the disputants, namely, the
belief that the problems were real, that it took men of exceptional
training and intelligence to formulate them.”18 He also writes that the
modern world is marked by an irrationalist worldview according to
which “unconscious and irrational influences outweigh the forces of
reason,”19 and by what might be termed a postrational view according to
15.
16.
17.

Id. at xxiii.
BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, supra note 1, at xlii.
ISAIAH BERLIN, Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century, in FOUR ESSAYS ON
LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 1.
18. Id. at 6–7.
19. Id. at 7.

844

WEINSTOCK FINAL ARTICLE

12/28/2009 10:50 AM

[VOL. 46: 839, 2009]

Berlin’s Methodological Parsimony
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

which “answers to problems exist not in rational solutions, but in the
removal of the problems themselves by means other than thought and
argument.”20
Thus, for Berlin, political concepts are intelligible relative to context,
and specifically to the problems and debates that emerge in particular
contexts. The problems that societies have to face are real, and the
conceptual resources used by those who aim to interpret and address
them can be assessed as better and worse depending on how well they
allow them to come to grips with the problems in question. Mistakes
can be made both by those who—as has in Berlin’s view been the wont
of twentieth-century political thinkers and actors—presume to solve
political problems without articulating them as problems amenable to
rational discussion and resolution and by those who articulate them
poorly. Thus Berlin’s view that “exceptional training and intelligence”
is required to formulate political problems adequately—choosing the
right terms in which to make sense of problems requires epistemic skills
that are not in Berlin’s view evenly distributed among people.
Reverting to the four kinds of positions described above on which
value pluralists must take a stand, we can see that Berlin is a pluralist,
and thus a cognitivist, who gives an original answer to the question of
the kinds of things that value terms are. Nothing that has been said thus
far tells us which position Berlin would take on the third and fourth
questions to do with the identification of the values that there are and the
methodology that we should employ to discover them.
My suggestion is that the passage from Two Concepts with which I
began provides us with a methodological principle that in Berlin’s view
should guide political thinkers and actors in the delineation of the
concepts that they employ to formulate political problems. Call this the
principle of “methodological parsimony.” According to this principle,
descriptions of political problems achieve greater adequacy to the degree
that they allow us to distinguish all of the normative considerations that
are at stake in the resolution of these problems. In other words, we can
be mistaken in two opposite ways in describing the ethical problems that
arise in the course of social interaction and of the operation of political
institutions. First, we can err on the side of prolixity by cutting normative
considerations too finely, ending up with “distinctions without differences,”
to employ a modern phrase. Or we can define our terms too encompassingly,
20.

Id.
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making it the case that normative considerations that ought to be
considered separately are bundled together. Slightly more formally, we
can define the requirement laid down by the principle of methodological
parsimony (MP) in the following manner:
MP: In describing a human situation of choice, all, and only,
normatively relevant considerations must be identified.
How does this principle tell in favour of a negative conception of
liberty? Imagine that there are two candidate conceptualizations of
freedom that might be used for the description of the same situation that
an agent A encounters. Call them F1 and F2. Imagine that the two
following statements describing the situation in question can be
constructed on the basis of these two conceptualizations:
1)
2)

A is F1.
A is F2 and X and Y.

If F2, X, and Y succeed in identifying independent normative
considerations that all illuminate A’s situation, then F2 is a better
conceptualization of freedom than F1 is. However, if one of F2, X, and
Y fails to pick out a consideration of independent moral importance, then
F1 is a superior conceptualization of freedom than is F2.
What methodological parsimony tells us is that when determining
what the extension of a normative concept is to be, we must be
parsimonious, that is, we must select the extensions that allow us to
identify as many normative considerations as possible, whilst avoiding
the identification of irrelevant considerations.
The suggestion is that negative liberty, defined by Berlin as “the
degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity,”21 is
the conception of liberty that best satisfies methodological parsimony. It
allows us to focus on the “nuclear, central, minimal meaning which is
common to all the many senses of this word, and which signifies
absence of restraint; more specifically, absence of coercion on the part
of specified or unspecified fellow human beings.”22
How might one challenge this claim? Two leading and highly influential
criticisms can be framed as applying methodological parsimony against
Berlin himself, specifically by suggesting that mere noninterference, if it
is not supplemented by other normative considerations, is trivial, and

21.
22.

BERLIN, supra note 1, at 122.
ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Freedom: Romantic and Liberal, in
POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE ROMANTIC AGE, supra note 14, at 155, 155.
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thus breaches the requirement that only normatively significant
considerations be employed in the description of human predicaments.23
This approach has famously been developed in different ways by
Charles Taylor24 and more recently by Philip Pettit.25 Taylor complains
that Berlin’s conception of freedom would have us count Enver Hoxha’s
Tirana as freer than contemporary London because of the greater number
of traffic lights in the latter.26 And Pettit has argued that Berlin might
have us count a slave as free, if it turned out that his master was
disinclined to impose too many obstacles upon him.27 Taylor, who has
been followed in this critique by perfectionist liberals such as Joseph
Raz,28 argues that liberty is of no normative significance if it is not the
liberty to exercise meaningful options.29 A purely quantitative or “spatial”
conception of freedom that eschewed normative considerations would in
his view be deficient as an understanding of freedom, for it would not
tell us why we care about freedom at all.30 And Pettit has famously
argued for a conception of freedom as “non-domination,” and has argued
that a certain resilience must attach to freedom for it to count as
freedom: it matters not only that I am free, but that I am immune from—
even the unexercised—ability to interfere arbitrarily with my will.31
An argument like Taylor’s could in Berlin’s defense be defeated by
questioning its empirical premise: though there may very well be more
traffic lights in London than there are in Tirana, I imagine that the
constant threat of violence that is characteristic of a totalitarian state like

23. One could imagine methodological parsimony being applied to Berlin in the
opposite way, that is, by suggesting that negative liberty as he construes it is too broad.
For example, one might claim that the concept of negative liberty is too broad because it
does not distinguish between human obstacles that result from intentional interference
and human obstacles that result from accidental interference. An objection posed in
these terms would have to show that it is normatively important to distinguish between
these two kinds of obstacle, that is, that we would decide how to act in different ways
depending on how we characterized the obstacle.
24. CHARLES TAYLOR, What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty, in 2 PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS: PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 211 (1985).
25. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT
(1997).
26. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 217–19.
27. PETTIT, supra note 25, at 22–23.
28. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
29. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 217–19.
30. Id.
31. PETTIT, supra note 25, at 21–27.
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Hoxha’s Albania actually produced a not inconsiderable amount of
unfreedom, negatively construed, numbers of traffic lights notwithstanding.32
But a deeper response would be to point out that Taylor denies
something that Berlin affirms, namely, that judgments about the freedom
of an individual or of a group need not be an all-things-considerednormative judgment. That is, even if it turned out to be the case that
Albanians under Hoxha were subject to fewer human obstacles than
inhabitants of London, this would not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that their overall situation was better than that of Londoners. They were
poorer, lived in constant fear, were deprived of the kinds of cultural
opportunities that Londoners take for granted, and so on. To say that
they were freer—operating on the basis of Taylor’s questionable
empirical assumption—does not in Berlin’s view constitute a final
judgment about their normative situation. It merely focuses attention on
one aspect of that situation, insisting that a perspicuous description of
their situation not end up lumping separate normative considerations
together.
But is the judgment that Albanians are freer even a prima facie
normative judgment? Is there anything to be said for liberty in the
absence of, say, economic opportunity, liberal democratic government,
cultural institutions, and the like? To answer these questions, consider
two distinct situations. Albania is much as Taylor describes it: backward
and benighted in all of the ways that Taylor describes, but with a
population that can go about its daily business without too much
interference. Schmalbania is as Albania, but with the difference that its
population does not have the admittedly impoverished liberty that
Albanians have. Most people would, I presume, rather avoid the fate
both of Albanians and of Schmalbanians, but if forced to choose, would
probably opt for the fate of the former. This suggests that bare Berlinian
liberty does denote a distinctive normative consideration, though
perhaps a more modest one than many suppose freedom to be, and thus
suggests that it does not breach the principle of methodological
parsimony.
These considerations apply to Pettit’s criticism as well. As is by now
well-known, Pettit argues that negative freedom is incompletely defined
if we omit from it what might be termed robustness conditions.
According to Pettit, I am unfree not only if someone interferes with me,
but also if someone has the power to interfere with me, whether he uses
the power or not. What is more, I am not unfree when this power is
employed nonarbitrarily.
32. For the relationship of fear to freedom, see Robert E. Goodin & Frank Jackson,
Freedom from Fear, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 249 (2007).
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I leave aside for present purposes the question of whether or not
Berlin’s account can capture without modification the kinds of “virtual”
obstacles to freedom that concern Pettit. Matthew Kramer has in this
context argued, in my view convincingly, that it is in fact an obstacle to
my negative liberty that someone have even the unexercised power to
interfere with me arbitrarily, as I am likely to tailor my behavior to avoid
this interference.33 Let us assume that there is a qualitative and not
merely a quantitative distinction between being subject of interference
and being subject to the ability to interfere. Is it not preferable to be able
to distinguish these distinct normatively relevant facts through two
distinct concepts? Do we not lose normative perspicuity by insisting
that there is one and only one concept in play? I believe that we do, and
that we lose the ability to recognize what is intuitively plausible, namely,
that it is preferable to be at liberty and dominated than it is to be both
dominated and interfered with. This recognition does not amount to the
claim that the former situation is morally attractive, all things
considered, but merely that it is normatively superior to a situation in
which one is subject to a master who is also inclined to use his power
uninhibitedly.
The gain in normative articulacy that a pared-down, negative
conception of liberty such as Berlin’s affords us can also be appreciated
by considering Pettit’s view that nonarbitrary interferences, such as
democratically decided upon laws, do not detract from one’s freedom at
all. Consider two worlds. In the first world, constraint and coercion
through law are required in order to achieve a good—say traffic safety—
or distributive equity. It is, in other words, much like ours. In the
second, these goods are delivered without requiring coercion and
constraint, either because agents have fully internalized the other
regarding concerns that the law embodies, or implausibly, because they
have no desires that detract from the achievement of the sought after
good. Pettit’s view of freedom gives us no way in which to distinguish
these two worlds, the one in which the goods require constraint, and the
other in which they do not. And yet they are different from a normative
standpoint. Surely a world in which the selfsame goods can be delivered
without any coercion is superior to one in which coercion is an

33. Matthew H. Kramer, Liberty and Domination, in REPUBLICANISM AND POLITICAL
THEORY 31 (Cécile Laborde & John Maynor eds., 2008). Kramer’s views are expounded
more fully in MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE QUALITY OF FREEDOM (2003).
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empirically necessary condition for the realization of these goods.
Again, it seems to me that the loss in articulacy counts against a more
encompassing conception of freedom such as Pettit’s.
Taylor and Pettit succumb to the understandable resistance that we can
all feel to the idea that a judgment concerning someone’s freedom is not
an all-things-considered judgment. But one can both be free and yet
afflicted by a number of other normatively significant conditions.
Berlinian methodological parsimony prevents us from succumbing to
this temptation and thus increases our normative articulacy.
III. INDEPENDENT JUSTIFICATIONS FOR METHODOLOGICAL PARSIMONY
I have thus far claimed that there is an argument to be recovered from
Berlin’s Two Concepts to the effect that our descriptions of the normative
predicaments of human agents must be governed by the methodological
assumption that they face more rather than fewer normative considerations
in their decisions. My claim was that methodological parsimony best
makes sense of the conjunction of Berlin’s particular form of cognitivism,
his value pluralism, and his eschewal of realist construals of value in
favour of a kind of historicist instrumentalism.
I would like in this part to provide independent philosophical warrant
for this position. Three claims seem to me to be relevant to making the
case for it.
The first claim has already been largely suggested in the foregoing
part. Methodological parsimony increases our precision and articulacy in
describing the situations of practical choice that we confront. All things
equal, more precision is better than less, as long as the level of precision
does not breach the relevancy requirement contained in methodological
parsimony.
Second, and relatedly, methodological parsimony leads to a construal
of our situation with regard to practical judgment that facilitates the
making of trade-offs and compromises. Now, Berlin is committed to a
metaethics that precludes us from reaching for a metric, such as utility,
to facilitate such trade-offs. However, methodological parsimony contributes
to the rational adjudication of conflicts in as much as it allows us to see
trade-offs as trade-offs. It may for example be perfectly legitimate to
limit the ability of citizens to dispose freely of their income for the sake
of narrowing socioeconomic divides in our society. But to claim that
such narrowings do not have costs in terms of liberty, and that they in
fact enhance our liberty—according to what has seemed to some to be
the most attractive construal of liberty, which defines freedom as
conditioned by a certain measure of interpersonal equity—merely
prevents us from seeing clearly the issues that we must face in modern
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societies. In the case of the relationship between the alleviation of
poverty and the reduction of socioeconomic inequality on one hand, and
the limitation of freedom on the other, such acts of definitional fiat will
most likely strike many citizens, whose support for policies of poverty
reduction will be required for the success of such policies, as
obfuscation.
Consider the definition of liberty proposed in a lecture delivered by
Ronald Dworkin in which he addresses Berlin’s claim that values often
conflict in political life. “Your liberty is your freedom to dispose as you
wish of property or resources that have been awarded to you under a
reasonably fair system of property and other laws, free from interference
of others, so long as you violate no one’s rights.”34 Whatever else is
gained from defining liberty in terms of fairness, it is certainly not our
ability to see trade-offs clearly. Indeed, it builds distributional fairness
into the very definition of freedom, and thus prevents us from construing
fairness and freedom as distinct normative requirements that must at
times be balanced off against one another.
Third, and finally, methodological parsimony raises the justificatory
bar in a salutary manner before those who would simply replace
argument for controversial normative claims by definitional fiat. As we
have seen, the words liberty and freedom are possessed of considerable
emotional freight. Many causes that precision would dictate that we
describe using terms other than these have in fact been argued for and
fought for under the banner of freedom. It is tempting indeed to invest
one’s favoured cause with the prima facie moral legitimacy and
emotional pull that freedom affords. But this does nothing to justify
one’s position. And, as we have seen, it leads to needless clouding of
the terms in which political compromises and trade-offs need to be
debated.
Thus, returning to Dworkin’s conceptualization of liberty in the
passage just quoted, though it may be strategically rational to argue for
fairness by making it into a dimension of freedom—then again, it might
not, as people who are antecedently ill-disposed to parting with their
wages for the sake of equity are not likely to be placated by the
suggestion that their freedom is thereby being increased—this does
nothing to increase the independent philosophical warrant of Dworkin’s

34. Ronald Dworkin, Do Values Conflict? A Hedgehog’s Approach, 43 ARIZ. L.
REV. 251, 254 (2001).
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conception of fairness. I hasten to add that Dworkin has elsewhere
provided powerful independent philosophical arguments for his
conception of distributive fairness—a fact that just makes it harder to
understand why he feels the need to adopt the definitional strategy.
Berlin’s conception of negative freedom as it is discovered by the
application of methodological parsimony is a homely and modest
dimension of human existence. Much else can be said, and usually
needs to be said, about human agents whose overall normative
conditions we want to ascertain, once we have determined whether they
are free or not. Those theorists and activists who want to convince us of
the importance of making some other normative consideration central to
this evaluation will have to argue for it directly, rather than by trying to
piggyback onto a normative consideration from which methodological
parsimony dictates that it be distinguished.
I have thus far illustrated the moral and pragmatic reasons we might
have for espousing Berlin’s methodological principles by making sole
reference to the concept of liberty and to authors that have violated
Berlin’s methodological strictures with respect to liberty. But the
problems that arise for moral and political reasoning when we fail to
heed these strictures can be felt in other areas of contemporary moral
and political philosophy. For example, as I have argued elsewhere, the
concept of health has in recent years succumbed to analogous
inflationary pressures as those experienced by the concept of liberty.
Health has come to encompass all dimensions of human existence
formerly captured under the concept of well-being, and the social
determinants, the distribution of which are thought to be relevant to the
determination of justice in health, have correspondingly grown to
encompass just about all objects of social policy. This has led to a loss
of articulacy analogous to what we currently experience with respect to
the concept of liberty.35
There are thus three reasons to adopt Berlin’s principle of
methodological parsimony. It increases our level of normative articulacy; it
facilitates the identification of trade-offs in the absence of a common
currency with which to adjudicate them when the need for them arises;
and it prevents the inadvertent or deliberate substitution of moral or
practical argument on behalf of other normative considerations by
definitional fiat.

35. I have explored these issues at greater length in Daniel M. Weinstock, How
Political Philosophers Should Think of Health, J. MED. & PHIL. (forthcoming 2010).
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IV. DISTINGUISHING METHODOLOGICAL PARSIMONY
FROM VALUE PLURALISM
In this final part, I want to dispel the impression that some readers
may be left with that I have not in fact revealed an aspect of Berlin’s
argument in Two Concepts distinct from the argument that I identified
with the “second phase” in the critical reception of the essay, linking
Berlin’s value pluralism to his privileging of negative liberty.
I have already provided one distinction between the two arguments.
In the hands of many authors who have implicitly or explicitly been
inspired by the final section of Two Concepts, value pluralism remains a
purely metaethical thesis, claiming that the moral universe is constituted
by an irreducible plurality of values. Methodological parsimony provides
pluralists with an important ingredient in the method of discovery that
they need in order to develop a substantive, first-order normative theory.
The application of the method to the succession of situations that we
must face as agents and as members of collectivities provides us with a
revisable—in the light of new experiences and situations—schedule of
values. Thus, methodological parsimony answers a question that is
related to but still distinct from the question to which value pluralism
provides elements of an answer.
What is more, if we eschew a realist construal of values, then
methodological considerations become primary. They aid us in defining
the values that are most useful and fecund to us in describing our
practical predicaments, rather than being answerable to an independent
axiological reality. So Berlinian methodological parsimony differs from
value pluralism at least in as much as it supplements the espousal by
Berlin of a metaethical theory with a method of discovery, the
application of which allows us to articulate a first-order theory of value.
However, the distinct nature of the argument can be appreciated in
other ways as well. For example, first-order value pluralisms can fail to
satisfy methodological parsimony. That a set of values contains more
than one value does not in and of itself guarantee that these values will
not be coarse grained. For example, a value pluralist who claims that all
practical decisions can ultimately be reduced to conflicts between liberty
and equality would, though a pluralist, fall foul of Berlin’s methodological
strictures. Methodological parsimony implies the search for a first-order
value pluralism with the highest possibility of granularity, subject of
course to the relevancy condition that is an important ingredient of
methodological parsimony.
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The distinctive nature of the argument for methodological parsimony
can also be appreciated by attending to the very different implications
that it carries, relative to the implications that flow from the mere
affirmation of value pluralism. What I want to show is that the argument
allows us to plug a pair of holes in Berlin’s argument for negative
liberty, one of them quite well-known, the other underappreciated.
The negative argument that I identified with the first phase of Two
Concepts’ philosophical reception claims that positive liberty, construed
as the rational governance of the will, is prone to giving rise to
philosophical abuses to a greater degree than negative liberty.
At first glance, this argument can be seen as wanting in virtue of its
applying a slippery slope to one conceptualization of liberty and not to
the other, whereas in fact, as Berlin himself recognizes in the introduction to
Four Essays on Liberty, “belief in negative freedom is compatible with,
and (so far as ideas influence conduct) has played its part in, generating
great and lasting social evils.”36
Is this concession fatal to this first line of argument? It need not be.
Methodological parsimony provides us with a more precise diagnosis of
what goes wrong in the case of positive liberty than does not go wrong
in the case of its negative counterpart. Abuse of positive liberty is due to
causes internal to it. It makes the satisfaction of certain rational
standards a condition for liberty. The tendency that may in certain sets
of circumstances cause positive liberty to be embodied in tyrannical
political forms is given rise to by following the conflation internal to the
conceptualization, rather than by trying to resist it.
However, when negative liberty gives rise to the kinds of inequities
that Berlin alludes to in the passage cited above, it is by doing something
that methodological parsimony, and the chastened conception of
negative liberty that flows from it, clearly warns against. When negative
liberty is elevated to the status of supreme value, as is the case in
libertarian theories such as Robert Nozick’s,37 it can lead us to
undervalue or even to ignore other important values such as solidarity,
equity, and the like. But this type of monism is precisely what the
argument that I have constructed on the basis of the methodology I have
attributed to Berlin precludes.
Thus, we are in a position to strengthen the first line of argument to
have emerged from Two Concepts by clearly distinguishing the slippery
slopes that confront the two rival conceptions of liberty. If Berlin is
right about positive liberty, then the adverse consequences that its
application can give rise to are, as it were, written into the concept itself.
36.
37.
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The slippery slope toward inequality and injustice that the hypostatization
of negative liberty can give rise to is for its part not necessitated by the
concept of negative liberty. Quite to the contrary, the limited extension
of the concept is in part generated by a more capacious overall theory of
value, capable of including other values alongside that of negative
liberty. Negative liberty makes most sense as an independent normative
consideration when it is part of a set of values including values other
than that of liberty. There is therefore something perverse, from the
point of view of such a theory, to focus as the libertarian argument does,
on negative liberty as the exclusive focus of normative attention. We
can thus appreciate that Berlin is not simply evincing an ideologically
motivated preference for negative liberty in placing particular emphasis
on the slippery slope to which positive liberty can give rise. An
emphasis on methodological parsimony can indeed explain both why
positive liberty is likely to give rise to deleterious political consequences,
and why negative liberty is less likely to do so.
The argument from methodological parsimony also allows us to attend
to a flaw in the argument for negative liberty from value pluralism that
has been made central in what I have called the second phase in the
critical reception of Two Concepts. Let me explain. Much ink has been
spilt in trying to determine whether a privileging of liberty is compatible
with value pluralism. John Gray and, in some moods, Bill Galston38
have both argued that a thoroughgoing pluralism does not provide
liberals with the theoretical purchase they require to give liberty pride of
place. A thoroughgoing pluralism would in their view make liberty just
one value among others. Any priority that liberals might be inclined to
ascribe to liberty would in their view constitute a denial of pluralism,
rather than an implication of it.
Liberals have been concerned with shoring up the steps in the
argument linking value pluralism and liberty.39 They have however not
been sufficiently attentive to the need to construct an argument to
establish that the conception of liberty that value pluralism underwrites
is of the negative variety. And indeed, there are strong prima facie

38. William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 ETHICS 516 (1995).
39. I have, in a Berlinian mood, contributed to this liberal exercise of reconciliation of
freedom and pluralism in a number of places, including Weinstock, supra note 4, and
more recently, Daniel M. Weinstock, Value Pluralism, Autonomy, and Toleration, in
MORAL UNIVERSALISM AND PLURALISM: NOMOS XLIX, at 125 (Henry S. Richardson &
Melissa S. Williams eds., 2009).
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grounds to think that the opposite is in fact the case, and that there is an
affinity between pluralism and positive liberty. For consider: pluralists
are at pains to distinguish pluralism from relativism. Pluralism is a form
of cognitivism about values, and so it is possible to be wrong about the
values one proposes to pursue. If this is the case, negative liberty—the
ability to pursue whichever value one wants unconstrained—does not
ensure against the pursuit of sham values. An argument from value
pluralism rather than relativism would seem to point toward the need for
a degree of positive liberty. Indeed, some degree of rational selfdirection is required in order to ensure that one’s actions will be in
pursuit of real rather than illusory values. Thus, it would seem that
value pluralism does not clearly establish the case for negative liberty as
against positive liberty. Liberals have thus far been at pains to show that
there is a link between pluralism and liberty, but they have paid
insufficient attention to the question of the kind of liberty that pluralism
underwrites.
Methodological parsimony can contribute to establishing the importance
of negative liberty by showing, first, that positive liberty bundles
together normative considerations that are for reasons of increased
articulacy best kept separate. Rational self-government—the ability to
scrutinize one’s wants and desires according to some rationally
defensible theory of the kinds of values that there are—is, to be sure, an
important normative consideration. It is better that one subject one’s
choices to some kind of rational scrutiny rather than acting solely on the
basis of the relative conative weight of contending desires. But
Berlinian methodological parsimony warns against the conflation of
rational self-government and of freedom. It is one thing to want to do
worthwhile things and not to want to do worthless ones. It is another to
be able to do what one wants to do. Ideally, one will want both of these
conditions to be satisfied: it is a better situation in which I am free to do
the worthwhile things that I want to do, than one in which I am free but
not rationally self-governed or one in which I am rationally selfgoverned but not free. The exact balance that should ideally be struck
between the two normative considerations is a subject of intense debate
between liberal perfectionists such as Joseph Raz and antiperfectionists
such as John Rawls. But it is common ground among all theorists that
the balance between these two normative considerations needs to be a
balance, in other words, that pluralism is best seen as grounding an
argument for the unimpeded freedom to choose among worthwhile
alternatives, rather than for the elimination of the individual’s margin of
personal discretion. In other words, the premise of value pluralism
grounds an argument according to which some degree of negative liberty
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is a nonnegotiable dimension of any normatively acceptable human set
of circumstances.
Thus, methodological pluralism comes to the rescue of the argument
from pluralism to negative liberty by excluding positive liberty as a
conception of liberty, and by suggesting that the ideal normative posture
of agents in the face of pluralism will be one that attempts to establish a
balance between the two distinct normative considerations that positive
conceptions of freedom misleadingly lump together.
V. CONCLUSION
I have in this paper attempted to do three things. First, I have shown
that the best way to make sense of a number of philosophical
commitments held by Berlin throughout his writings is to ascribe to him
not only the affirmation at the metaethical level of value pluralism, but
also the belief at the methodological level in a principle of
methodological parsimony. I have also endeavoured to show that two
prominent critiques of Berlinian negative liberty can be framed in the
terms provided by the principle of methodological parsimony, but that
Berlin’s construal of liberty possesses the resources to withstand the
challenge.
Second, I have shown that there are independent philosophical
arguments for the principle of methodological parsimony. It increases
our level of philosophical articulacy, thereby putting us in a strong
position from which to engage in the politics of trade-off and
compromise that is a central part of democratic decisionmaking in the
context of value pluralism. It also forces theorists and politicians to
argue for their preferred positions directly, rather than smuggling them
in as components of normative considerations, such as freedom or
health, possessed of considerable motivational efficacy.
Finally, I have suggested that the principle of methodological
parsimony allows us to plug holes that have plagued both the first and
second periods in the critical reception of Two Concepts.
This essay leaves many questions unanswered. Crucially, it defers for
another occasion the question of how to assess and compare schedules of
values that methodological parsimony does not allow us to distinguish.
Methodological parsimony allows us to say something about the greater
articulacy afforded to us by sets of values that are more or less
encompassing. It tells us nothing about the comparisons of sets of
values that are simply not comparable in this manner. The possibility of
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radically incommensurable ways of dividing up axiological space
suggests that methodological parsimony is not the only methodological
principle that will have to be at work in a fully adequate method of
moral discovery.
Still, I hope enough has been said in this essay to suggest that it will
be part of any such adequate methodology, and that Isaiah Berlin can
fairly be credited with having seen and appreciated its importance.

858

